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ABSTRACT 
Nicholls, Curtis Michael (Ph.D., Accounting, Department of Accounting and Business  
 
Law) 
 
The Impact of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases on Firms’ Cost of Equity  
 
Capital 
 
Thesis directed by Associate Professor Steven Rock 
 
 
 
I study the impact of an SEC investigation (as captured by Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases, or AAERs) on a firm’s cost of equity capital. AAERs are often used in 
accounting literature as a proxy for fraudulent financial reporting. Fraudulent financial reporting 
should lead to an increase in cost of equity capital as a firm’s future cash flows become less 
certain. Several factors could contribute to the increase in risk surrounding future cash flows, 
such as renegotiation of contracts with the firm’s suppliers and lenders, or a decrease in the 
reliability of management disclosures. Cross-sectional variation likely exists in the relation 
between receiving an AAER and firms’ cost of equity capital. One attribute of that variation may 
be the ‘severity’ of the AAER. Using shareholder lawsuits, management turnover, core earnings 
and auditor censure, I attempt to correlate the severity of the AAER with changes in cost of 
equity capital. The economic consequences of accounting-related enforcement actions as 
captured by my study should be of interest to analysts selecting a discount rate to apply to future 
earnings in determining target prices, regulators interested in the impact of 
iv 
 
regulatory action and the effectiveness of the SEC, and academics interested in measuring the 
impact of accounting-related government regulation and the performance of cost of equity capital 
measures in capturing expected changes in discount rates.  
Overall, I find that my study provides evidence of changes in cost of equity capital for 
firms targeted by an SEC AAER on the date the investigation is first made public. Multivariate 
tests of changes in cost of equity capital surrounding AAER issue dates do not yield changes in 
cost of equity capital that differ from the corresponding change for a matched sample of firms. 
Furthermore, I do not find an association between the ‘severity’ of an AAER and the change in 
cost of equity capital for sample firms. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
I study the impact of SEC investigations (as indicated by SEC Accounting and Auditing 
Releases, or AAERs) on a company’s cost of equity capital. Prior academic research analyzes the 
impact of AAERs on share price [(e.g., Feroz et al. (1991) and Karpoff et al. (2008)] and 
documents the types of investigations that are more likely to result in subsequent litigation 
against the firm’s auditor (Bonner et al. 1998). Several studies use AAERs as a proxy for 
fraudulent financial reporting.1 In a related stream, recent research studies the impact of earnings 
restatements on cost of equity capital (Hribar and Jenkins 2004), indicating that an earnings 
restatement increases the cost of equity capital. While these studies and others examine SEC 
investigations or use such investigations as a proxy for fraudulent activity, the impact of an 
AAER on a company’s cost of equity capital remains undocumented. 
Though my study does not directly examine earnings restatements, it extends research 
relating to the impact of an earnings restatement on cost of equity capital (Hribar and Jenkins 
2004) by focusing on a specific set of firms accused of fraudulent financial reporting. Hribar and 
Jenkins (2004) do not distinguish their sample firms’ intent in originally misreporting financial 
results. Research by Hennes et al. (2008) suggests that earnings restatements can be the result of 
unintentional misreporting (accounting errors) or intentional misreporting (accounting 
                                                 
1 e.g., Dechow et al. (1996), Beneish (1997 and 1999), Hennes et al. (2008) and Dechow et al. (2008). 
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irregularities). My study furthers this stream of research by focusing on a specific group of firms 
cited by the SEC for fraudulent misreporting of financial results. 
Beginning with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed in 2002, the past few years have seen a 
significant increase in government regulation centered on financial reporting. SEC investigations 
culminating in an AAER increased dramatically in 2002 (by 28% over 2001 cases) and have 
maintained increased levels in subsequent years. The chairman of the SEC, Christopher Cox, 
called 2006 ‘a banner year for enforcement’ (Hume 2006) citing its perfect court record during 
the year and two record settlements (related to AIG and Fannie Mae). Recently appointed SEC 
chairman Mary Schapiro suggests that she will seek to expand the responsibilities and funding of 
the SEC (Ackerman 2009), aiming to further increase its enforcement capacity. Given the 
increase in government regulation and oversight, this study is a timely review of the 
repercussions of company actions that lead to government sanctions.   
This study also attempts to measure the severity of the fraud underlying the SEC 
investigation and test for its differential impact on targeted firms’ cost of equity capital. 
Several prominent accounting scandals involving financial misreporting have gained widespread 
press coverage over the past decade. For example, in 2002, auditors at WorldCom uncovered 
financial misreporting in excess of $3.8 billion (Pulliam and Solomon 2002), prompting an 
immediate SEC investigation which culminated in a settlement payment to the SEC of $750 
million and WorldCom’s eventual bankruptcy (AAER-1811). AAERs can also target other 
corporate actions such as backdating stock options. Pediatrix Medical Group provides a recent 
example in which the SEC cited the firm for backdating stock options. By failing to recognize 
employee expenses associated with the stock options (by selecting favorable option grant dates), 
Pediatrix Medical Group overstated earnings by $8.8 million (6.4 percent of net income) (AAER-
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2943). The $3.8 billion WorldCom fraud is many orders of magnitude higher than option 
backdating at Pediatrix Medical Group and thus likely to result in greater consequences. This 
dissertation also attempts to capture the impact of the perceived difference in severity on a firm’s 
cost of equity capital. 
My study also offers indirect evidence of the SEC’s effectiveness in addressing emerging 
areas of fraudulent reporting. The SEC’s stated intent in issuing AAERs is to curtail fraudulent 
accounting activity by sending a clear message to the market indicating types of reporting that 
the SEC finds illegal (Feroz et al. 1991). If investigated firms suffer an increased cost of equity 
capital, then managers’ incentives to avoid fraudulent behavior become stronger, providing 
evidence that the SEC’s enforcement action is achieving the desired result: a curtailment of 
fraudulent financial reporting at publicly-traded firms (SEC 2008). 
This study should be of interest to regulators interested in the impact of regulatory action 
as they consider future enforcement actions and directives. The insights gained here could help 
regulators evaluate the effectiveness of recent changes introduced at the SEC.2 Analysts should 
find aspects of this study interesting when refining the discount factor applied to a firm after it 
has been targeted by an SEC investigation by using this study’s results related to severity. Both 
academics interested in measuring the cost to a firm for engaging in fraudulent behavior 
subsequently sanctioned by the SEC, as well as academics interested in the ability of the 
employed cost of equity capital measures to capture the expected change in discount rates, 
should also find this study of interest. 
 Using a composite measure for cost of equity capital and the first public disclosure of an 
investigation, I find that a firm’s cost of equity capital does change significantly as a result of an 
                                                 
2 For example, the SEC recently announced the creation of teams of specialists focused on specific types of fraud in 
response to criticisms that its current, more general staff has difficulty identifying fraud involving complex 
transactions (Scannell 2009).  
4 
 
 
SEC investigation, relative to matched firms not subject to an SEC investigation. My results do 
not indicate a differential impact on firms’ cost of equity capital in the period surrounding the 
issuance of an AAER, again relative to a matched sample of firms that do not receive an AAER. 
The results are robust to using individual measures of cost of equity capital. Multivariate testing 
of the differential impact of proxies of severity, which include shareholder lawsuits, management 
turnover, auditor censure, and impact on core earnings, do not provide evidence that the severity 
of the fraudulent behavior is associated with the change in equity capital at a firm targeted by an 
AAER. Empirical results of severity hold for both the investigation date and the AAER issue date. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews existing 
literature related to SEC investigations and restatements, Chapter 3 develops the hypotheses 
tested in this paper, Chapter 4 outlines the methodology I use to test the impact of SEC AAERs 
on a firm’s cost of equity capital including the development of the various cost of equity capital 
measures, Chapter 5 reports results of empirical testing and tests of robustness, Chapter 6 offers 
concluding remarks and suggestions for future research, and the appendix reviews a selection of 
papers related to the evaluation of the cost of equity capital measures and suggestions for 
improving the measures. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
II. EXISTING LITERATURE 
 
2.1 ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT RELEASES 
Introduced in 1982, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) were 
initiated by the SEC to replace Accounting Series Releases (Feroz et al. 1991). The stated 
purpose of the AAER series is “to enable interested persons to easily distinguish enforcement 
releases involving accountants from other Commission releases” (AAER-1). 
Typically, enforcement actions that involve accountants are related to financial reporting, 
which has led to a number of studies using AAERs as a proxy for fraudulent reporting; examples 
include Dechow et al. (1996), Beneish (1997 and 1999), Dechow et al. (2008) and Hennes et al. 
(2008). Other enforcement actions are often issued in conjunction with AAERs and can relate to a 
wide assortment of illegal behavior (e.g., insider trading, tax evasion). 
Bonner et al. (1998) evaluate AAERs by examining the types of fraudulent activity cited 
and find that litigation against the firm’s auditor is more likely to arise when the fraudulent 
behavior relates to fictitious transactions or in instances when the fraudulent reporting is 
common in nature.3 Geiger et al. (2007) use AAERs as a proxy for lower financial reporting 
quality in a study examining company hiring of former external auditors. The primary focus of 
Geiger et al. (2007) is the pre-SOX practice of “revolving door” hires: the employment of 
                                                 
3 Bonner et al. (1998) suggest an increase in revenue or decrease in expenses as an example of common fraudulent 
activities, as opposed to overstating accounts payable as an example of uncommon fraudulent behavior. 
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individuals from the company’s external auditors as accounting or finance executives.4 Geiger et 
al. (2007) find that ‘revolving door’ hires comprise a small percent of hires made in the period 
1985-2002; furthermore the market views these hires favorably for small companies (evidenced 
by 3-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of the hire). Geiger et al. 
(2007) extend their research by examining post-hiring financial reporting quality, with AAER’s 
and abnormal accruals providing alternative proxies for financial reporting quality. The authors 
document that “revolving door” hires do not appear to be associated with lower financial 
reporting quality.  
Feroz et al. (1991) (hereafter FPP) examine 224 AAERs issued from 1982 to 1989 and 
find that the majority of releases are related to overstatements that ultimately impact income, 
with average downward income restatements of over 50 percent. Furthermore, FPP find that top 
management changed, through attrition or dismissal, for 72 percent of the sample firms, and that 
81 percent were targeted by shareholder lawsuits, additional indications that the market, and 
firms’ boards, react negatively to SEC investigations. FPP also find a substantial negative market 
reaction to AAERs, with two-day negative abnormal returns averaging about 13 percent.  
The SEC selects cases based on its ability to successfully prosecute and the potential 
market message produced by issuing the AAER (Feroz et al. 1991).5 The SEC’s success rate6 
exceeded 90 percent during the period 2004-2007, the most recent period for which success rates 
are available (across all investigations, including investigations into areas outside of accounting) 
(SEC 2008). AAERs are filed in successful accounting-related investigations, with the typical 
                                                 
4 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 barred “revolving door” hires by preventing audit firms from auditing firms in 
which a company executive performed audit services for the firm within the previous one-year period (SEC 2003). 
5 ‘Market message’ is defined by the ability of the investigation to address current and emerging disclosure issues as 
well as the targeted firm’s level of visibility in the market (Feroz et al. 1991). 
6 Success rate is determined by litigation successfully levied against the offender (SEC 2008). 
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AAER outlining the action or settlement and details of the fraudulent behavior, often including 
financial figures.7 
By initiating an investigation into a company, the SEC provides disclosure to the market 
of suspected fraudulent behavior. Assuming the SEC is successful, future earnings of the 
targeted firm become more risky, as the firm will likely cease income-increasing fraudulent 
activities, as well as restate past earnings, a key predictor of expected future earnings. Feroz et 
al. (1991) reveal the additional company risk stemming from the investigation announcement by 
documenting abnormal returns. As noted above, FPP find two-day abnormal negative returns of 
about 13 percent surrounding the initial announcement of the SEC investigation. Feroz et al. 
(1991) further examine the cumulative abnormal return surrounding the SEC investigation 
announcement for firms that previously disclosed accounting concerns. The cumulative 
abnormal return for this subsample is about -6.0 percent in days {-1,0}. Feroz et al. (1991) 
conclude: 
This implies that the market reacts negatively to the SEC’s investigation, even with 
prior knowledge of the error. This incremental market effect of investigations may be 
related to negative publicity and the impact of the SEC’s position on future third-
party lawsuits. At a minimum, the ability of the SEC investigations to affect targets’ 
market prices indicates that the agency possesses a viable sanction because managers 
have market-based invectives to avoid investigations. (Feroz et al. 1991, p. 124) 
 
Karpoff et al. (2008) (hereafter KLM) extend this stream of research by studying a 
sample of SEC and Department of Justice enforcement actions issued from 1978 to 2002. Similar 
to Feroz et al. (1991), KLM find a significant decline in one-day market-adjusted returns 
surrounding what the authors classify as the ‘trigger event’, the first public indication of the 
enforcement action. The most common ‘trigger events’ include company restatements, company 
                                                 
7 All AAERs are assigned an associated litigation number by the SEC. A manual check confirmed that all AAERs 
within the sample contain an associated litigation number. Furthermore, a manual search of the targeted firms 
confirmed that no targeted firm was first targeted by SEC litigation which preempted the AAER. 
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announcements of irregularities or government inquiries, class-action filings, auditor departures, 
and unusual trading activity.8 KLM suggest three components to the market loss associated with 
the enforcement action. First, KLM note a market loss related to the correction of reported 
financial results.  The authors measure the market loss by applying the market-to-book and price-
earnings ratios from before the enforcement action to the restated results. For example, consider 
a firm with reported earnings of $1 per share and a price-earnings ratio of 10 (share price of $10) 
before restating earnings. After restating earnings, the corrected earnings-per-share equals $0.50. 
Applying the pre-restatement P/E ratio (10) to the corrected EPS, the resulting share price is $5 
per share, a decline in share price of 50 percent. Next, KLM measure the expected government 
fines and lawsuit damages. After measuring these two components, KLM find that a significant 
amount of market loss is still unaccounted for, which the authors attribute to reputational loss. 
KLM suggest the lost reputation results in renegotiations with suppliers and lenders that will 
increase the cost of operations and cost of capital.  
KLM rely on an important assumption in applying pre-restatement ratios to post-
restatement prices and earnings. KLM assume that the trigger event does not change the 
expected risk and subsequent ratios applied to the identified firm, which allows the application of 
pre-restatement ratios to restated results. This study differs from KLM by attempting to capture 
the changes in risk surrounding future cash flows, as indicated by a change in the discount factor 
applied to cash flows (or cash flow proxies) used in determining a firm’s market price. In other 
words, an AAER or factors leading to an AAER, likely cause a change in the rate used to discount 
future cash flows or similarly, the P/E multiple, both of which are not addressed in the KLM 
study. 
                                                 
8 Other ‘trigger events’ documented by KLM include ‘investigations by other federal agencies…, delayed SEC 
filings, management departures, whistleblower charges, and routine reviews by the SEC.’ (Karpoff et al. 2008,  p. 
587)  
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Similar to KLM, Murphy et al. (2007) examine cases of corporate misconduct reported in 
the The Wall Street Journal Index. The authors test the impact of corporate misconduct on firm’s 
future profitability and cost of equity capital. Two features distinguish this dissertation from 
Murphy et al. (2007). First, their measure of profitability and cost of equity capital include 
changes in earnings, EBIDTA, earnings forecast dispersion, and stock return volatility, but do 
not directly include cost of equity capital measures. Second, the authors do not exclusively focus 
on events involving fraudulent reporting, instead they consider any form of misconduct (e.g., 
antitrust, bribery, price-fixing). Murphy et al.’s (2007) results mirror those documented by Feroz 
et al. (1991) and Karpoff et al. (2008): corporate misconduct negatively impacts cited firms, with 
decreases in expected earnings and increases in stock return volatility surrounding the 
misconduct.  
Murphy et al.’s (2007) findings are subject to alternative explanations: by selecting a 
sample based on a news agency’s reporting, the sample is potentially biased by any 
predisposition of the agency’s employed reporters. Furthermore, the sample contains any form of 
news related to a wide range of topics classified as ‘corporate misconduct’,9 which is a sub-
sample of the larger body of any negative news reported about a firm. Murphy et al’s (2007) 
results could be capturing the market’s negative reaction to bad news. This dissertation focuses 
on a specific set of firms clearly distinguished, or marked, for fraudulent behavior, avoiding the 
potential bias introduced by reliance on a news agency for reporting violations. In addition, by 
using SEC AAERs to identify firms, this dissertation focuses on bad news specifically related to 
fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
                                                 
9 Murphy et al. (2007) define corporate misconduct as  “the subject keywords adopted by The Wall Street journal 
Index such as, antitrust, breach of contract, bribery, business ethics, conflict of interest, copyright/patent 
infringement, fraud, kickbacks, price-fixing, securities fraud, and white-collar crime” (Murphy et al., 2007, p. 5). 
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2.2 RESEARCH RELATED TO FINANCIAL MISREPORTING 
A large body of relevant accounting research examines the causes and consequences of 
earnings restatements. Hribar and Jenkins (2004) provide the most closely-related study to this 
dissertation, using three of the cost of equity capital measures outlined in Chapter V to evaluate 
the impact of an earnings restatement on a restating firm’s cost of equity capital. The authors 
document a significant increase in restaters’ cost of equity capital (with average increases 
ranging from 7 to 19% depending on the model of cost of equity capital).  
 This paper differs from Hribar and Jenkins (2004) (hereafter HJ) along several important 
dimensions. First, HJ evaluate the impact of restatements without consideration of the nature of 
the restatement. As described earlier, Hennes et al. (2008) (hereafter HLM) suggest that all 
restatements do not represent intentional misrepresentation of financial results. HLM develop a 
system to separately identify a restatement that results from intentional misreporting 
(irregularities) as opposed to unintentional misreporting (errors). HLM’s system of capture 
includes examining individual restatements for the presence of the words ‘fraud’ or 
‘irregularity’, identifying firms that undergo additional investigations into the source of the 
restatement, and including firms targeted by SEC or DOJ investigations. Using a sample of 
restatements in the period 2002 to 2005, HLM find that 24 percent of the restatements included 
are the result of accounting irregularities (intentional misreporting). HLM then utilize their 
subsample of firms to document more severe market reactions (measured as negative cumulative 
abnormal returns surrounding the restatement), increased likelihood of civil lawsuits levied 
against the firm, and increased likelihood of management turnover relative to firms that restated 
financial reporting unrelated to irregularities. HLM’s results provide strong evidence that firms 
engaging in fraudulent behavior face less forgiving consequences. My dissertation attempts to 
11 
 
 
capture the ‘fraudulent’ component of restatements which are not separately considered in Hribar 
and Jenkins’ (2004) related cost of equity capital research. 
Another distinction of this study from Hribar and Jenkins (2004) is that while HJ include 
an indicator variable for SEC-initiated restatements, they do not attempt to capture firms that 
may have misled the market via mechanisms other than income or income-related accounts, 
which likely still have implications for risk. Companies receiving an SEC AAER may be required 
to restate balance sheet information or be cited for misbehavior that does not require any 
restatement of financial data. HJ do not find that SEC initiation of a restatement impacts cost of 
equity capital (when controlling for other factors). In fact, according to HJ, only restatements 
initiated by a company itself or its auditor differentially impact the cost of equity capital.10 
 In Kasznik’s (2004) discussion of HJ, he notes several challenges to HJ’s findings. First, 
Kasznik documents the downward revision in analyst forecasts over the forecast horizon for the 
entire I/B/E/S universe of firms during HJ’s test period. By using the sample firms in prior 
periods as their own match, HJ increase the likelihood that cost of equity capital changes over 
the event period as analyst forecasts were revised downward for firms on average. This study 
addresses the bias from downward forecast revision by using a matched sample. The matched 
firm will likely incur its ‘normal’ downward revision, allowing me to isolate the investigated 
firm’s downward revision. Next, Kasznik suggests that restatements, which often follow the 
announcement of SEC investigations or delayed government filings, decrease the risk or 
uncertainty surrounding a firm’s future cash flows. If an earnings restatement does decrease the 
risk surrounding a firm’s future cash flows, then the cost of equity capital measures’ ability to 
proxy for risk becomes less clear in the context of restatements. Kasznik (2004) argues that the 
                                                 
10 Initiation by the company or auditor increases the cost of equity capital beyond increases associated with SEC 
initiation or an unidentified initiator. 
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restatement announcement itself generates the increased risk surrounding future cash flows as the 
market is uncertain of the extent and nature of possible a restatement. My study builds on 
Kasznik’s (2004) argument by focusing on both the investigation announcement, an event that 
more clearly creates greater uncertainty about future cash flows, and the subsequent issue of the 
related SEC AAER. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Feroz et al. (1991) document negative consequences associated with firms receiving 
AAERs including shareholder lawsuits, management turnover, and declining market value. These 
results indicate that the market punishes firms that are caught reporting fraudulent financial 
results. The decline in market value is the possible result of several factors; for example, many 
market valuation models assume past performance is a determinant in future profitability. 
Restatements cause the inputs in such valuations to change, resulting in a revision in the 
expected future profitability. Furthermore, valuations based on ratio analysis would also require 
revisions as the ratios are adjusted for the corrected financial data. The firm may also be 
impacted by violation of debt covenants and changes in future contracting.  
 Central to the decline in market value associated with an AAER is an increase in the risk 
surrounding future cash flows. KLM suggest the higher cost of capital is a result of contracting 
changes with suppliers, buyers, and lenders, as these interested parties adjust expectations about 
the company’s reliability, capacity to fill future orders, and ability to service debt. Future cash 
flows become less predictable and more risky because the contracting changes are not 
immediately clear. In addition to contracting changes, the firm may be subjected to related 
shareholder lawsuits and government penalties which may or may not be estimable from the 
commencement of the SEC’s investigation. Focusing on the commencement of the SEC’s 
14 
 
 
investigation is critical to this hypothesis as the implications for cost of equity capital change 
once the SEC issues its findings. 
 The increase in cost of equity capital hypothesized is based on recent research indicating 
that firm-specific information risk is a non-diversifiable risk factor in determining firms’ cost of 
equity capital. Easley and O’Hara (2004) document that “information asymmetry between 
informed (those with private information) and uninformed (those with only public information) 
investors causes both the quality and quantity of information available to investors to affect the 
required rate of return and, in turn, the cost of capital” (Kravet and Shevlin 2010, p. 265) This 
information asymmetry argument is applied to earnings restatements by Kravet and Shevlin with 
the following: “when firms restate their financial statements, investors reassess their perceptions 
of those firms’ financial information” (Kravet and Shevlin, 2010, p. 265).  Using the restatement 
literature presented in Chapter 2, I apply Kravet and Shevlin’s argument that the announcement 
of an SEC investigation causes a “decrease in the credibility of management and an increase in 
investors’ concerns that management is opportunistically making accounting decisions” (Kravet 
and Shevlin, 2010, p. 265), which leads to an increase in the information risk of the firm. 
Measuring the change in cost of equity capital related to the SEC’s investigation as 
detailed above is the foundation for my first hypothesis, stated in the alternative form:  
H1.1: Firms convicted of fraudulent financial reporting, as indicated ex-post by an SEC 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER), will experience an increase in cost of 
equity capital surrounding the public announcement of an investigation by the SEC. 
  
Complicating the timing of expected impacts is the presence of a related restatement 
issued by the targeted firm which preempts the announcement of an SEC investigation. As 
indicated earlier, firms issuing a restatement appear to bear an increased cost of equity capital 
(Hribar and Jenkins 2004) independent of the underlying cause of the restatement. By identifying 
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the underlying cause of individual restatements, Hennes et al. (2008) find a more pronounced 
decrease in a firm’s stock price when its restatement is related to an accounting irregularity. 
Figure 1 models the possible timing of restatements related to the announcement and subsequent 
issue of an SEC AAER. If a firm restates its financial reports, the restatement can occur before, in 
conjunction with, or subsequent to either the investigation announcement date or the AAER issue 
date. Based on Hribar and Jenkins (2004) and Hennes et al.’s (2008) findings, the market has 
likely increased a firm’s cost of equity capital as a result of the financial restatement. Therefore, 
the subsequent announcement of an SEC investigation is likely attenuated by the preemptive 
restatement.  
If a company issues a restatement in conjunction with the announcement of an SEC 
investigation, or following the announcement of an SEC investigation, the restatement likely 
contains additional information content, but should not impact prior announcements of SEC 
investigations. The SEC does not issue notices for unsuccessful closure of investigations, 
therefore the market could perceive a restatement as a successful resolution of the SEC 
investigation without an associated AAER. However, the market could also perceive the 
restatement as confirmation of fraudulent behavior and expect a subsequent AAER.11 
The complications introduced by a related restatement form the core of hypothesis H1.2: 
H1.2: The magnitude of change in a fraudulent (identified via a subsequent SEC AAER) firm’s 
cost of equity capital surrounding the announcement of an SEC investigation will be decreased 
by a preemptive restatement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Because my sample employs AAER issuances to identify firms, my study does not capture information related to 
firms investigated by the SEC that do not receive a subsequent AAER 
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FIGURE 1 
 
Timeline of AAERs and Associated Events 
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Paralleling the impact of the announcement of an SEC investigation, the bookend event: 
closure of the investigation indicated by the issuance of an AAER, may also impact a firm’s cost 
of equity capital. Upon announcement of the SEC’s investigation, the company faces a variety of 
financial and legal challenges, including the possibility of civil lawsuits, adverse market reaction, 
and the considerable resources of the SEC’s investigation, all of which contribute to the change 
in cost of equity capital hypothesized in hypotheses H1.1 and H1.2 above. If the SEC 
unsuccessfully investigates the company, or uses other means to settle the investigation (e.g., a 
deferred prosecution agreement),12 then the market receives no formal indication of the 
conclusion. If the SEC successfully investigates the company and subsequently issues their 
findings in an AAER, the market receives formal information related to the conclusion of the 
SEC’s investigation. The AAER provides details of the company’s fraudulent behavior, possibly 
providing additional information for civil lawsuits and criminal investigations, thereby 
increasing the riskiness associated with future cash flows.  
My second hypothesis, stated in the alternative form, attempts to capture this uncertainty 
initiated by the release of an SEC AAER: 
 H2.1: Firms convicted of fraudulent financial reporting, as indicated ex-post by an SEC 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER), will experience an increase in cost of 
equity capital surrounding the issuance of an SEC AAER. 
 
As previously outlined, a related restatement of financial statements by the targeted firm 
provides additional information to the market. The timing of the restatement in relation to the 
issuance of the AAER is again critical to assessing the information delivered to the market. If the 
restatement arrives before the AAER, it could preempt the information content of the AAER, 
                                                 
12 A deferred prosecution agreement includes a form of settlement without court proceedings, similar to the 
agreement reached between KPMG, the Department of Justice, and the IRS in 2005. KPMG admitted to creating 
phony tax shelters and agreed to pay $456 million in restitution (IRS 2005). Thanks to Professor Lance Cole for 
indicating deferred prosecution agreements as an alternative to AAERs as an investigation resolution.  
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thereby negatively attenuating the impact of the AAER. If the restatement occurs in conjunction 
with, or following, the AAER issuance, it likely does not impact the change in cost of equity 
capital surrounding the issuance of the AAER. Hypothesis H2.2 endeavors to measure the 
additional implications of a related restatement of financial statements: 
H2.2: The magnitude of change in a fraudulent firm’s cost of equity capital surrounding the 
issuance of an SEC AAER will be decreased by a preemptive restatement. 
 
In summary, two dates related to the SEC’s decision to investigate a company become 
relevant in examining the impact of the investigation. First, the date the SEC initially announces 
its intent to investigate a firm, and second, the date the SEC concludes its investigation by 
issuing an AAER.  
As documented by Feroz et al. (1991), not all AAERs result in shareholder lawsuits, 
management turnover, or auditor censure. This suggests that interested parties assign a measure 
of severity to the AAER and subsequently take action if they find the fraudulent reporting to be of 
an adequate level to warrant action. Shareholders must weigh the cost of litigation against their 
probability of success; more extreme cases of fraudulence likely result in a higher probability of 
success for shareholder lawsuits. In the case of management turnover, if the board believes 
current management is responsible for the government sanction and the behavior is egregious 
enough, they will replace management. Finally, the government assesses the auditor’s role in 
fraudulent reporting to determine the need to censure the auditor via additional litigation.13  
Each of these situations adds a level of severity to the AAER, increasing the potential 
impact on the firm’s cost of equity capital. My final hypothesis, stated in alternative form, 
examines this role of severity in determining the change in cost of equity capital: 
H3: The increase in cost of equity capital will be greater when the fraudulent reporting is more 
severe. 
                                                 
13 Auditor censure typically takes the form of an additional AAER filed against the company’s external auditor. 
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Mirroring my outlook captured by hypotheses H1.1 and H2.1, my hypothesis related to 
severity applies to both the investigation announcement and AAER issue dates as the severity 
of the investigation and associated AAER should be consistent for both dates. In other words, I 
test hypothesis H3 in the periods surrounding both the investigation announcement and the 
AAER issue. Furthermore, analogous to the attenuation effect hypothesized in H1.2 and H2.2, an 
associated restatement by the targeted firm before the event dates could provide preemptive 
information to the market, causing the market to adjust the firm’s cost of equity capital in 
expectation of an SEC investigation. I control for the preemptive information provided by an 
associated restatement issued prior to the event date.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 SAMPLE SELECTION 
 To test my hypotheses, I begin with a sample of 454 unique firms targeted by an SEC 
AAER between December 1996 and August 2007. This sample of 454 firms includes 1,205 
AAERs, resulting in an average of 2.7 AAERs issued per firm. After collecting the necessary data 
to calculate the variables included in my models, 156 firms with available data in both 
Compustat  and CRSP remain. 
Feroz et al. (1991) examine the date that the reporting violation begins, which is separate 
from the investigation announcement date. The mean interval between the reporting violation 
and the disclosure of the SEC investigation is ten months, with a range of zero days to four years. 
It is important to note that not all investigations result in an AAER; therefore, studying the initial 
date of reporting violations does not capture the impact of the SEC’s decision to investigate the 
firm. This is an important distinction separating my study from Feroz et al. and Murphy et al. 
(2007), which captures any public disclosure of ‘corporate wrongdoing’, independent of 
regulatory action.  
For each of the 156 firms, I manually collect the announcement date of the SEC’s 
investigation via a Lexis/Nexis search covering the two years prior to the issuance of the AAER. 
The search is conducted using the search terms ‘SEC investigation’ coupled with the firm name, 
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and simply ‘SEC’ when the search including ‘investigation’ delivers no results. Search results 
including ‘SEC’ and ‘investigation’ in the two years prior to the AAER resulted in varying 
numbers of ‘hits’. In the case of high-profile companies, the search often resulted in hundreds of 
‘hits’; for smaller firms, the search results were often inconclusive or limited in number. In the 
event that a search in the two years preceding the AAER issue did not provide an investigation 
date, I extended the search another two years. If no investigation announcement is discovered in 
the four years prior to the issue of an AAER, the firm is not included in the investigation 
announcement date sample. 
 Once the investigation dates are collected, I check for required Compustat and CRSP data 
for each of the 156 firms in the period surrounding the investigation announcement date and 
issue date. These data requirements cause the samples surrounding each of the dates to be 
different, as some firms have available data for one date and not the other.14 The sample related 
to the investigation announcement date contains 64 firms from the original 454 firms, whereas 
the sample related to the AAER issue date contains 67 firms. The investigation announcement 
and issue date samples contain 49 common firms.15  
Using the firms in the investigation announcement date sample, I collect a matched set of 
firms; matching on both size and industry. First, I narrow my search for a ‘control’ firm using the 
four-digit Standard Industry Classification code (per Compustat) to identify a possible set of 
matches. In all but one case I was able to find a suitable match within the first four digits of the 
assigned classification system; for the exception firm, no comparison firm existed within the 
                                                 
14 For example, Sunbeam contains the necessary forecasts and accounting data when the SEC investigation is 
announced. However, the SEC investigation and related restatements cause Sunbeam to enter bankruptcy and 
subsequent delisting (Atlas and Tanner 2001) before the SEC issues its AAER. Sunbeam is included in the 
investigation announcement date sample, but not in the subsequent issue date sample.  
15 Nine of the firms in the investigation announcement sample eventually declared bankruptcy (identified via CRSP 
delisting codes 552, 560, 561, 570, 574 and 584), four of which declared bankruptcy before the AAER issue date. 
The remaining five bankrupt firms are included in both samples. 
22 
 
 
group of firms matched on four digits, therefore I used only the first two digits to identify a set of 
appropriate match firms. Next, I sort the firms using market capitalization at the end of the firm’s 
fiscal year prior to the event. I then assign the firm with the closest market capitalization to the 
‘treatment’ firm as the ‘control’ firm.  
Following the process used to collect the match sample for firms surrounding the AAER 
issue date, I collect a second matched sample based on both size (market capitalization) and 
industry (SIC codification). It is important to note that the control sample identified for the AAER 
issue date is different from the control sample selected for the sample of firms surrounding the 
investigation announcement date. For firms in both samples (the investigation announcement 
date and AAER issue date), it is possible to have a different matched firm as firm size for both 
‘treatment’ and ‘control’ firms is subject to change between the event periods.16 
 
4.2 MODELS 
4.2.1 THE VARYING MODELS OF COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL 
After I identify a matched sample, I calculate cost of equity capital using the composite 
method outlined at the end of this chapter. The composite measure of cost of  
equity capital17 has been used in a number of recent studies which evaluate changes in cost of 
equity capital.18 The composite measure of cost of equity capital is the average of four measures 
of cost of equity capital that have been used in various forms throughout the past several years in 
                                                 
16 No observations were dropped as a result of there being available information in the month prior to the event, but 
missing data in the month directly subsequent the event. Observations dropped due to missing information 
subsequent to the event could introduce a survivorship bias to the results. 
17 Firms’ cost of capital is not restricted to equity capital. Modern finance theory often employs the Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital (WACC) when considering the cost of capital for a firm. WACC is calculated as Cost of 
Equity*(Equity/(Debt+Equity))+Cost of Debt*(1-Tax Rate)*(Debt/(Debt+Equity) (Ogier et al. 2004, p. 8). Because 
the cost of equity is a core component in calculating WACC, any change in Cost of Equity will impact the firm’s 
WACC. Therefore, a change in cost of equity is sufficient in signifying a change in a firm’s WACC. 
18 Examples include Dhaliwal, Heitzman and Li (2006), Hail and Leuz (2006), Cheng and Lin (2008) and Li (2010). 
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published accounting research. The validity and usefulness of the four measures, as well as the 
composite, are widely debated and often discounted.19 The purpose of this paper is not to 
evaluate the measures, but instead to measure the impact of AAERs.20  In untabulated results, 
using Cronbach’s alpha I test the internal consistency of the four measures and the composite 
measure. Cronbach’s alpha is 0.73 for the measures calculated around the investigation date, and 
0.83 for the measures calculated surrounding the AAER issue date. As both alpha’s exceed 0.7, 
the measures appear to consistently measure the same object (which is intended to be the directly 
unobservable cost of equity capital). 
Contemporary accounting research often employs one of the following models to 
measure cost of equity capital.21 The models are founded on derivations from the dividend 
growth model,22 with differences in models largely related to assumptions regarding the terminal 
value.  
The basic dividend growth model is as follows: 

  10 )1(t tE
t
r
DP          (1) 
where: 
P0 = price at time t = 0; 
Dt = dividends (per share) at time t; 
rE = cost of equity capital. 
                                                 
19 See the appendix for a sample of the criticisms surrounding the various cost of equity capital measures. 
20 As outlined in the conclusion to this paper, once the impact of SEC AAERs on cost of equity capital is established, 
future research could use this setting to evaluate the four measures of cost of equity capital, or subsequently 
proposed measures from future studies.  
21 Cost of equity capital is often associated with more explanatory measures that utilize historic information to 
forecast future cost of equity capital (e.g., CAPM or APT). Accounting research is often concerned with measuring 
the current cost of equity capital being applied by the market, which is the main objective of the models described in 
this paper. This measure is often referred to as the ‘implied cost of equity capital applied by the market’. 
22 See Ehrhardt (1998) for information on the origin and derivation of the dividend growth model. The model is also 
referred to throughout this chapter as the dividend discount model. 
24 
 
 
Because the entire stream of future dividends cannot be forecast, measures often truncate the 
model by utilizing a terminal value to capture the future cash stream. The remainder of this 
section recounts the measures employed in this paper (the measures and descriptions are adopted 
as outlined in Botosan and Plumlee (2005)).  
Gordon Growth Model 
 Gordon and Gordon (1997) transform the dividend growth model using analysts’ 
forecasts of dividends and earnings as proxies for the market’s expectations. Gordon and Gordon 
(1997) further suggest that individual firm ROE reverts to its equity cost of capital beyond the 
forecast horizon (Botosan and Plumlee, 2005). The resulting transformation is given below: 

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where: 
Et = forecasted earnings per share for time t; forecasted EPS numbers are collected from I/B/E/S. 
dpst = the actual dividends as calculated by the dividend payout ratio in the current year.  
P0 = the average daily price collected from CRSP  
rGGM = cost of equity capital as measured by the Gordon Growth Model. 
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Gebhardt et al. (2001) Industry Model 
 Gebhardt et al. (2001) transform the dividend growth model by inserting an ROE term 
calculated using the firm’s industry ROE. The resulting equation is: 

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ROEt = 
1t
t
bv
e
 
bvt = book value per share at time t 
rGLS = cost of equity capital as measured by the Industry Method. 
P0 = the average daily price collected from CRSP.  
ROE in the first seven years of the model is calculated using analysts’ forecasts of 
earnings, growth, and dividends (book value is calculated assuming clean surplus). ROE in the 
following years is calculated by assuming that ROE reverts to the industry median in a straight-
line manner. The terminal value is assumed to carry into perpetuity. Therefore, Gebhardt et al. 
(2001) rely on a 100 percent dividend payout ratio beyond year t = 11 (Botosan and Plumlee 
2005). The Gebhardt et al. (2001) industry model is derived from the Residual Income model 
proposed by Ohlson (1995).  The relationship between the Residual Income model and the 
Industry model can be derived from the Industry model by including clean surplus assumptions. 
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Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) Economy-Wide Growth Model23 
 Ohlson and Juettner-Naroth (2005) utilize a series of mathematical transformations and 
assumptions to convert the Gordon growth model to the following: 
)(
)1( 1121
grr
epsrdpsreps
r
epsP
OJOJ
OJOJ
OJ
t 
       (4) 
where: 
epst = One and two-year ahead analysts’ forecasts collected from I/B/E/S. 
dpst = the actual dividends paid in year t, collected from Compustat. 
Pt = the average daily price collected from CRSP 
rOJ = cost of equity capital as measured by the economy-wide growth model. 
Growth, as represented by g, is the risk-free interest rate less 3%. The risk-free interest 
rate is represented by the yield on 10-year Treasury notes.  Gode and Mohanram (2003) point out 
that the economy-wide growth model is an attractive measure of cost of equity capital because it 
does not constrain assumptions about the dividend payout ratio and allows the short-term and 
long-term growth rates to differ (with the long-term growth rate moving asymptotically to the 
economy-wide growth rate).  
 
Price Earnings Growth (PEG) Ratio Method 
Easton and Monohan (2005) convert the economy-wide growth model by assuming a no 
abnormal earnings growth beyond the second period and dps1 = 0. These two assumptions allow 
the economy-wide growth model to be converted to: 
0
12
P
epsepsrPEG
          (5) 
                                                 
23 See Gode and Mohanram (2003) for a discussion of the assumptions and mathematical transformations necessary 
to derive the economy-wide growth model. 
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where: 
epst = One and two-year ahead analysts’ forecasts collected from I/B/E/S. 
P0 = the average daily price collected from CRSP 
rPEG = cost of equity capital as measured by the PEG ratio model. 
Composite Measure 
 I aggregate the cost of equity capital measures into one measure by using the average of 
the four measures. This average measure is similar to the measure used in many recent studies 
including Hope et al. (2008) and Cheng and Lin (2008). This measure is calculated as: 
4
GGMPEGGLSOJ
AVG
rrrr
r
        (6) 
 This composite measure is used to conduct the tests outlined in the paper. To measure the 
change, I first calculate each of the four models and, subsequently, the composite measure in the 
month directly preceding the announcement of an SEC investigation. I re-calculate each of the 
four measures and associated composite measure in the month directly subsequent to the 
announcement. This mirrors the method utilized by Hribar and Jenkins (2004).  
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4.2.2 MODELS TO TEST HYPOTHESES 
 After calculating the change in cost of equity capital for the sample of firms targeted by 
an AAER and the matched sample, I test the first hypothesis, the impact of receiving an AAER, by 
utilizing the following model: 
ititititoit IndustryLeverageSizeAAERCEC   7
0
321   (7) 
where:  
ΔCEC = the change in cost of equity capital using the composite method constructed in model 
(6) for the month prior to the investigation announcement date and the month 
immediately following the announcement date.   
AAER = an indicator variable set equal to one for firms targeted by an SEC investigation and do 
not experience an associated restatement, or have an AAER investigation announcement 
in concurrence with a restatement.  
Size = natural log of total assets  
Industry = indicator variable for a firm’s industry membership based on the Standard Industry 
Classification codes using the first digit from Compustat’s codification. 
Leverage = the sum of long and short-term debt divided by common equity. 
Size and Industry are included as a control variables in the model based on Hribar and 
Jenkin’s (2004) results. The Industry variable is constructed using the first digit of the firm’s 
Standard Industry Classification code. Using only one-digit classifications allows the model to 
avoid over specification.  In addition to size and industry, Hribar and Jenkin’s core results 
document that firm leverage is significantly associated with the change in cost of equity capital 
(higher levels of leverage result in a larger increase in cost of equity capital). I include the 
variable Leverage, measured as the sum of long and short-term debt divided by equity, to control 
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for the influence of leverage.  The choice of levels of leverage as a control variable is deliberate 
for two reasons: 1) leverage is unlikely to change in the two-month period surrounding the event, 
and 2) a higher level of leverage is likely to be associated with more restrictive debt covenants, 
contributing to the possibility of a covenant violation and thereby increasing the related future 
cash flow risk.  
Model (7) is modified by adding a restatement variable to test hypothesis 1.2, as follows: 
itititititoit IndustryLeverageSizeRstateAAERCEC   7
0
4321 (8) 
where all variables, excepting Rstate, are as defined for model (7). Rstate captures company 
restatements of financial reports in the period beginning two years before the announcement of 
an SEC investigation. I identify restatements during this window using the GAO database.24 This 
variable is included to control for the negative impact an earnings restatement has on cost of 
equity capital, as documented by Hribar and Jenkins (2004), and the attenuation effect a 
restatement may cause on the subsequent announcement of an SEC investigation. Rstate is 
calculated as the change in earnings (as a result of the restatement) divided by total assets. The 
original company earnings data is collected from the Compustat unrestated quarterly earnings 
file. 
Testing hypothesis H2 follows the pattern employed to test hypothesis H1, utilizing a 
mirror image of model (7), as shown below: 
ititititoit IndustryLeverageSizeAAERCEC   7
0
321   (9) 
All variables in model (9) are calculated as defined in model (7) by substituting AAER 
issue date for the investigation announcement date. In other words, the only exception from 
                                                 
24 GAO database information is provided, with permission, from Andy Leone’s website: 
(http://sbaleone.bus.miami.edu/), including the ‘irregularity vs. error’ classification outlined in Hennes et al. (2008).  
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model (7) is the event, with model (9) capturing the issue of an SEC AAER as its study event. 
Similarly, model (10), as outlined below, copies model (8), adding the Rstate variable, but for the 
period surrounding the issuance of an AAER: 
itititititoit IndustryLeverageSizeRstateAAERCEC   7
0
4321 (10) 
 Feroz et al. (1991) identify several significant non-quantitative factors related to firms 
being issued an AAER, including management turnover in 72 percent of the cases, and 
shareholder lawsuits in 81 percent of the cases. Bonner et al. (1998) find that the auditor is 
censured in 39 percent of the cases in their sample of 261 firms targeted by AAERs between 1982 
and 1995. To test hypothesis H3 I employ these non-quantitative factors to measure the severity 
of the AAER. The model to test hypothesis 3, which is repeated both for the investigation 
announcement date and the AAER issue date is: 
itit
ititiit
IndustryLeverage
SizeRstatempositeSeverityCoCEC




7
0
6
5410
   (11) 
where: 
ΔCEC = the change in cost of equity capital using the composite method constructed in model 
(6) for the month prior to the event and the month immediately following the event date.   
SeverityComposite = MgmtTurn + ShldLawst + CoreEarnings + AudCen 
MgmtTurn = indicator variable set equal to one if the CEO or CFO is terminated or resigns from 
their post in the two-year window before and after the event date. 
ShldLawst = indicator variable set equal to one if the company is targeted by a shareholder 
lawsuit related to the financial reporting in the period from the initial SEC investigation 
to one year after the final AAER. 
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CoreEarnings = indicator variable set equal to one if the SEC AAER specifically indicates 
manipulation of revenue, cost of sales, or operating expenses from continuing operations. 
AudCen = indicator variable set equal to one if the firm’s auditor is targeted by an associated 
SEC AAER.25 
All other variables are as previously defined. 
MgmtTurn is included in the model based on Hennes et al.’s (2008) finding that 
management turnover is more likely in restatement cases identified as fraudulent. The authors 
assert that boards force management out in an effort to restore financial reporting credibility. I 
collect management turnover data from ExecuComp for the one year before and after the 
investigation announcement and subsequent AAER issue date.  
In cases of fraudulent financial reporting, shareholders can bring a class action suit 
against the company. Shareholders must evaluate the extent of their loss before deciding to 
embark on the costly litigation process. Shareholders will engage in a class action lawsuit against 
the firm in cases where the shareholders believe their loss, and consequential recourse, exceeds 
the legal costs. Furthermore, by taking legal action the shareholders increase the severity of the 
AAER as the company will likely be forced to incur additional legal costs and punitive damages 
associated with the AAER, which may or may not be estimable. The possibility of legal costs and 
punitive damages cause additional uncertainty about the firm’s future cash flows. ShldLawst is 
included in the model to proxy for the severity implied by the shareholder lawsuit. Following 
Hennes et al. (2008), shareholder lawsuits are collected manually using a Lexis/Nexis search and 
from the Stanford Class Action Clearinghouse (http://securities.stanford.edu) in the period from 
the initial SEC investigation to one year after the final AAER for the firm is issued. Once 
                                                 
25 An additional AAER targeting the firm’s auditor is typically issued in conjunction with the AAER targeting the 
firm (in some cases the auditor is addressed directly in the AAER targeting the firm). However, in some cases the 
censuring AAER occurred on a different date, but references the AAER targeting the firm. 
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potential lawsuits are identified, I verify the lawsuit is related to financial reporting by reading 
the summary of the lawsuit provided by the Stanford Class Action Clearinghouse. 
In Hribar and Jenkins’ (2004) study of restating firms, one variable consistently surfaces 
as a factor in the magnitude of change in a restating firm’s cost of equity capital: Core Earnings. 
Core Earnings, as it relates to restatements, is defined as a restatement that impacts revenue 
recognition, cost of sales or operating expenses from continuing operations. This paper defines 
Core Earnings as an SEC AAER that specifically designates behavior manipulating revenue 
recognition, cost of sales, or operating expenses from continuing operations. This data was 
collected by reading the text of each AAER related to a company within the sample.  
As documented above, on average 2.7 AAERs are associated with each firm in the 
sample. Often the additional AAERs target the company’s auditor or individuals within the firm. 
For the SEC to censure the auditor denotes that the auditor was aware of the financial 
misreporting and may have engaged in some form of collusion to allow the misreporting to 
occur, presenting a more severe form of reporting fraud.26 AudCen is collected by manual review 
of AAERs related to a given firm with the purpose of capturing the severity associated with the 
auditor censure issued in conjunction with the AAER. 
Rstate, Size, Leverage, and Industry continue to be included in the model as control 
variables based on Hribar and Jenkins (2004). Rstate in this model is included to control for the 
preemptive impact a restatement may have on a firm’s cost of equity capital. In other words, 
according to Hribar and Jenkins the market increases the cost of equity capital for a firm that 
issues a restatement and therefore has already increased the cost of equity capital for a firm that 
issues a preemptive restatement. 
                                                 
26 Alternatively, the SEC may be punishing the auditor for failing to capture the fraudulence. 
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Many of the severity measures utilized in this study are constructed using ex post 
measures to determine the perceived ex ante severity. For example, shareholder lawsuits are 
often generated by shareholders that become aware of corporate misconduct via an SEC 
investigation. However, all SEC investigations do not lead to shareholder lawsuits; therefore, I 
am making the assumption that shareholders examine their expected rewards measured against 
their expected costs. A contributing factor to the expected rewards is the probability of 
successful litigation, which would be impacted by shareholder’s perceptions about the severity of 
corporate misconduct. Associated arguments can be made for assumptions relating to auditor 
censure (the SEC only prosecutes in cases in which they believe the auditor acted fraudulently), 
and management turnover (the board acts to punish executives if the misconduct is egregious). 
As noted above, SeverityComp is the summary measure capturing the presence or 
absence of management turnover, a shareholder lawsuit, core earnings, and auditor censure. 
SeverityComp is calculated using the following equation: SeverityComp = MgmtTurn + 
ShdlLawst + Core Earnings + AudCen; therefore, SeverityComp takes a value ranging from zero 
to four, hypothesis H3 indicates that the change in cost of equity capital is an increasing function 
in the severity of the SEC investigation; therefore, I expect the coefficient for β1 to be positive. 
 It is possible that the component measures included in SeverityComp have a differential 
impact on the change in cost of equity capital. As a final test I separate SeverityComp into its 
components using the following model: 
ititititit
itititit
IndustryLeverageSizeRstateAudCen
gsCoreEarninShldLawstMgmtTurnCEC




7
0
7654
3210
  (12) 
where all variables are as defined above. Separation of the variables into the individual 
components allows for an empirical test of the differential impacts the four proxies for severity 
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may have on the change in cost of equity capital, relative to firms not experiencing these severity 
indicators. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. Table 1, Panel A contains descriptive 
statistics for the sample surrounding the SEC investigation announcement date. The average 
(median) cost of equity capital for the combined sample is 11.97% (9.00%) before the event date, 
and 12.97% (10%) after the event date, resulting in an average (median) change of 0.81% 
(.11%). Breaking the combined sample in to its respective components (treatment and control 
firms) provides some clarity to the change in cost of equity capital. The average (median) change 
in cost of equity capital for the firms targeted by an SEC investigation is 1.54% (0.40%), 
whereas for the match firms the change is lower, with an average (median) change of 0.08% 
(0.03%). Univariate tests of mean differences are included in the next section.  
 Of the firms investigated by the SEC, 84.4% (54 firms) have an associated restatement.  
The matched sample contains no restatements during the event window. The majority of firms 
(74.1%) issue their associated restatement prior to the announcement of an SEC investigation.27 
The average magnitude of earnings restated is -.111, which indicates that the average restatement
                                                 
27 I assume that any restatement issued in close proximity to the SEC investigation announcement or AAER is an 
associated restatement. It is possible that a restatement in this period is unrelated. My assumption is based on the 
reverse argument in Hennes et al. (2008) that a restating firm with an AAER has engaged in ‘irregular’ reporting.  
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Table 1, Panel A: Descriptive Statistics, Announcement Date Related to SEC Investigation Date 
 AAER Firms 
(n=64) 
Match Firms 
(n=64) 
Combined Sample 
(n=128) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Cost of Equity Capital, Prior 12.86% 10.00% 11.08% 9.00% 11.97% 9.00% 
Cost of Equity Capital, After 14.41% 11.00% 11.17% 8.00% 12.79% 10.00% 
Δ in Cost of Equity Capital 1.54% 0.40% 0.08% 0.03% 0.81% 0.11% 
Size 3.18 3.05 3.18 3.17 3.18 3.13 
Leverage 6.32 1.29 2.12 0.94 4.23 1.18 
# Restate Before 40  0    
Magnitude of Restatement -0.111 0 0 0 -0.056 0 
 
Table 1, Panel B: Descriptive Statistics, Announcement Date Related to AAER Issue Date 
 AAER Firms 
(n=67) 
Match Firms 
(n=67) 
Combined Sample 
(n=134) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Cost of Equity Capital, Prior 11.91% 9.00% 11.31% 9.00% 11.61% 9.00% 
 Cost of Equity Capital, After 12.33% 10.00% 11.55% 8.00% 11.94% 9.00% 
Δ in Cost of Equity Capital 0.35% 0.01% 0.22% 0.06% 0.28% 0.02% 
Size 3.21 3.05 3.16 3.15 3.19 3.11 
Leverage 5.53 0.97 2.10 0.94 3.81 0.96 
# Restate Before 48  0    
Magnitude of Restatement -0.104 0 0 0 0.052 0 
CEC measures are calculated using the composite method outlined in Chapter 4. Change in Cost of Equity Capital is the difference between the Cost of Equity 
Capital measures before and after the event. # Restate Before represents the number of firms issuing a coinciding restatement of financial statements formally 
filed with the SEC which preempt the event. Size is measured as the natural log of total assets. Leverage is calculated as the Sum of Long-term and Short-term 
Debt divided by Total Equity at the end of the fiscal year of the announcement Magnitude of Restatement is calculated as the % change in earnings as a result of 
the firm’s earnings restatement for all firms that restate prior to the event date.
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reduced earnings by 11.1 percent of total assets. Only a small number of cases (four firms) issue 
a restatement in concurrence with the SEC’s announcement. The average size (measured as the 
log of total assets) of the combined sample is 3.18, Leverage (measured as the sum of short- term 
and long-term debt divided by equity) is 4.26 (debt exceeds equity by more than four times).  
Table 1, Panel B contains similar descriptive statistics for the sample collected 
surrounding the AAER issue date. Average (median) cost of equity capital for the combined 
sample is 11.61% (9.00%) before the event date, and 11.94% (9.00%) after the event date. For 
this sample, the differences between the sample and control group do not appear to be sizable but 
are tested using statistical methods in the next section. The mean (median) leverage for the 
combined sample is 3.81 (0.96). Of the firms targeted by the SEC, 79.1% (48 firms) issue an 
associated restatement, with the majority of restatements (71.6%) preempting the issuance of an 
AAER. The average restatement for this sample reduced earnings by 10.4 percent. 
 Table 2 contains industry information for sample firms in both the investigation and 
AAER date samples. Several industries are represented within the samples, with no industry 
dominating the sample. Business Services contains the largest number of targeted firms (nine and 
twelve, respectively for the investigation and AAER date samples). Business Services includes 
many software companies, consistent with SEC statements regarding its intent to target emerging 
industries (Feroz et al. 1991).  
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Table 2: Industry Classifications 
Investigation Date AAER Issue Date 
Two-digit SIC Industry 
# of 
firms % of sample 
# of 
firms % of sample 
Metal, Mining 1 1.56% 1 1.49% 
Oil & Gas Extraction 2 3.13% 3 4.48% 
Food & Kindred Products 1 1.56% 3 4.48% 
Apparel & Other Textile 
Products 1 1.56% 2 2.99% 
Paper & Allied Products 2 3.13% 2 2.99% 
Chemical & Allied Products 2 3.13% 2 2.99% 
Petroleum & Coal Products 1 1.56% 1 1.49% 
Fabricated Metal Products 2 3.13% 2 2.99% 
Industrial Machinery & 
Equipment 3 4.69% 2 2.99% 
Electronic & Other Electrical 
Equipment 6 9.38% 6 8.96% 
Instruments & Related Products 6 9.38% 7 10.45% 
Communications 2 3.13% 2 2.99% 
Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 2 3.13% 2 2.99% 
Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods 5 7.81% 1 1.49% 
General Merchandise Stores 1 1.56% 1 1.49% 
Apparel & Accessory Stores 1 1.56% 1 1.49% 
Furniture & Home Furnishings 
Stores 1 1.56% 1 1.49% 
Miscellaneous Retail 2 3.13% 1 1.49% 
Depository Institutions 3 4.69% 3 4.48% 
Security & Commodity Brokers 1 1.56% 1 1.49% 
Insurance Carriers 2 3.13% 3 4.48% 
Holding & Other Investment 
Offices 2 3.13% 1 1.49% 
Personal Services 1 1.56% 1 1.49% 
Business Services 9 14.06% 12 17.91% 
Educational Services 1 1.56% 1 1.49% 
Engineering & Management 
Services 2 3.13% 2 2.99% 
Transportation Equipment 0 0.00% 2 2.99% 
Electric, Gas & Sanitary 
Services   2 3.13%   1 1.49% 
Total Firms   64 100.00%   67 100.00% 
*Note the match sample contains match firms with the same distribution across industries.
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5.2 UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
 Table 3 contains univariate tests of differences for several key variables. Results 
in Panel A document that both parametric and non-parametric tests are statistically significant for 
the cost of equity capital after the announcement of an SEC  
investigation. In other words, the cost of equity capital is statistically different between the 
treatment and control firms. This result is repeated using parametric tests for the change in cost 
of equity capital. In Panel B, both parametric and non-parametric tests fail to document 
statistically significant differences between the treatment and control firms. Overall, univariate 
results specify a relationship between the announcement of an SEC investigation, but no 
convincing evidence concerning changes surrounding the issuance of an SEC AAER. 
Table 4 reports the Spearman (above the diagonal) and Pearson  (below the diagonal) 
correlation matrix for the independent variables found in models (7), (8), (9) and (10). The AAER 
and restatement variables are highly correlated in both samples, which is not surprising given the 
high number of restatements for firms that receive an AAER. 
The Spearman (above the diagonal) and Pearson (below the diagonal) correlation matrix 
for model (11) is found in Table 5. The final correlation matrix, contained in Table 6, records the 
independent variables found in model (12). Several of the proxies for severity are correlated. In 
summary, univariate results indicate that several of the component measures may be collinearly 
associated, potentially limiting multivariate results.  
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Table 3, Panel A: Univariate Tests, Announcement Date Related to SEC Investigation Date 
 AAER Firms 
(n=64) 
Match Firms 
(n=64)    
 Mean Median Mean Median t-test p-value z-test p-value 
Cost of Equity Capital, Prior 12.86% 10.00% 11.08% 9.00% -1.21 0.114 -1.47 0.143 
Cost of Equity Capital, After 14.41% 11.00% 11.17% 8.00% -1.82 0.036** -2.24 0.025** 
Δ in Cost of Equity Capital 1.54% 0.40% 0.08% 0.03% -1.70 0.046** -1.14 0.173 
Size 3.18 3.05 3.18 3.17 0.01 0.994 0.23 0.817 
Leverage 6.32 1.29 2.12 0.94 -1.42 0.161 -1.65 0.010* 
 
 
Table 3, Panel B: Univariate Tests, AAER Issue Date 
 AAER Firms 
(n=67) 
Match Firms 
(n=67)    
 Mean Median Mean Median t-test p-value z-test p-value 
Cost of Equity Capital, Prior 11.91% 9.00% 11.31% 9.00% -0.42 0.337 -1.05 0.294 
Cost of Equity Capital, After 12.33% 10.00% 11.55% 8.00% -0.51 0.304 -1.16 0.246 
Δ in Cost of Equity Capital 0.35% 0.01% 0.22% 0.06% -0.31 0.377 0.28 0.781 
Size 3.21 3.05 3.16 3.15 -0.33 0.744 -0.16 0.875 
Leverage 5.53 0.97 2.10 0.94 -1.21 0.232 0.07 0.949 
** (*) significant at the 5 (10) percent level using one-tailed p-values; except Size and Leverage, which use two-tailed p-values. 
CEC measures are calculated using the composite method outlined in Chapter 4. Change in Cost of Equity Capital is the difference between the Cost of Equity 
Capital measures before and after the announcement of an SEC investigation.. Size is measured as the natural log of total assets. Total Assets are measured at the 
end of the fiscal year of the announcement. Leverage is calculated as the Sum of Long-term and Short-term Debt divided by Total Equity at the end of the fiscal 
year of the announcement. T-test and associated p-values are reported using tests of mean differences. Z-test and the associated p-values are calculated using the 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test. 
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Table 4: Spearman and Pearson Correlation Matrix, Variables in Models (7), (8), (9), and (10):  
Panel A: Investigation Announcement Date Sample (n=128) 
 AAER Rstate Size Leverage 
AAER 1.000 -0.187** -0.021 0.146 
Rstate 0.056 1.000 -0.022 0.043 
Size -0.001 0.042 1.000 0.606*** 
Leverage 0.125 -0.010 0.392 1.000 
 
 
Panel A: AAER Issue Date Sample (n=134) 
 AAER Rstate Size Leverage 
AAER 1.000 -0.228*** 0.014 -0.006 
Rstate -0.084 1.000 -0.057 0.050 
Size 0.029 0.029 1.000 0.590*** 
Leverage 0.105 0.105 0.065 1.000 
** *(**,*) significant at the 1 percent (5, 10 percent) level using two-tailed tests. 
Above the diagonal reports Spearman rank correlations, below the diagonal reports Pearson correlations. 
AAER is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the investigation announcement is concurrent with an associated restatement or the firm does not issue a 
restatement. Rstate is the magnitude change in earnings for a firm that issues a restatement prior to the announcement of an SEC investigation. Leverage is the 
sum of total long-term debt and short-term debt over total equity at the end of the fiscal year of the announcement of an SEC investigation.  
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Table 5: Spearman and Pearson Correlation Matrix, Variables in Model (11):  
Panel A: Investigation Announcement Date Sample (n=64) 
 Severity 
Composite 
Rstate Size Leverage 
SeverityComposite 1.000 0.049 -0.223 -0.125 
Rstate -0.069 1.000 0.008 0.083 
Size -0.134 0.062 1.000 0.602*** 
Leverage -0.017 -0.017 0.041 1.000 
 
 
Panel B: Issue Date Sample (n=67) 
 Severity 
Composite 
Rstate Size Leverage 
SeverityComposite 1.000 0.098 -0.242* -0.101 
Rstate 0.097 1.000 -0.032 0.070 
Size -0.204 0.164 1.000 0.552*** 
Leverage 0.062 0.012 0.020 1.000 
** *(**,*) significant at the 1 percent (5, 10 percent) level using two-tailed tests. 
Above the diagonal reports Spearman rank correlations, below the diagonal reports Pearson correlations. 
Severity Composite is the sum of four variables: MgmtTurn, ShldLawst, Core Earnings, and AudCen. MgmtTurn is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is 
fires the CEO or CFO in association with the AAER, ShldLawst is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is targeted by a class-action lawsuit, Core Earnings 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the AAER targets core earnings, and AudCen is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is targeted by an 
associated SEC AAER. Rstate is the magnitude change in earnings for a firm that issues a restatement prior to the announcement of an SEC investigation, Size is 
measured as the natural log of total assets, and Leverage is calculated as the sum of long and short term debt divided by equity. 
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Table 6: Spearman and Pearson Correlation Matrix, Variables in Model (12):  
 
Panel A: Investigation Announcement Date Sample (n=64) 
 Mgmt 
Turn 
Shld 
Lawst 
Core 
Earnings 
AudCen Rstate Size Leverage 
MgmtTurn 1.000 0.156 -0.061 0.029 0.210 0.004 0.029 
ShldLawst 0.156 1.000 -0.091 0.017 0.136 0.130 -0.010 
CoreEarnings -0.061 -0.091 1.000 0.232 -0.048 -0.358*** -0.200 
AudCen 0.029 0.017 0.232 1.000 -0.169 -0.020 0.096 
Rstate 0.109 0.101 -0.223 -0.104 1.000 0.008 0.083 
Size 0.041 0.114 -0.358*** -0.014 0.062 1.000 0.602 
Leverage 0.089 -0.236 0.119 -0.046 -0.017 0.041 1.000 
 
 
Panel B: Issue Date Sample (n=64) 
 Mgmt 
Turn 
Shld 
Lawst 
Core 
Earnings 
AudCen Rstate Size Leverage 
MgmtTurn 1.000 -0.301** -0.088 -0.034 0.092 -0.050 -0.073 
ShldLawst -0.301** 1.000 -0.146 -0.025 0.149 0.027 0.059 
CoreEarnings -0.088 -0.146 1.000 0.111 0.027 -0.353*** -0.074 
AudCen -0.034 -0.025 0.111 1.000 -0.201 0.036 -0.091 
Rstate 0.149 0.190 -0.146 -0.073 1.000 -0.032 0.070 
Size -0.007 0.014 -0.336** 0.047 0.164 1.000 0.552*** 
Leverage 0.137 -0.212 0.147 -0.027 0.018 0.020 1.000 
** *(**,*) significant at the 1 percent (5, 10 percent) level using two-tailed tests. 
Above the diagonal reports Spearman rank correlations, below the diagonal reports Pearson correlations. 
Severity Composite is the sum of four variables: MgmtTurn, ShldLawst, Core Earnings, and AudCen. MgmtTurn is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is 
fires the CEO or CFO in association with the AAER, ShldLawst is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is targeted by a class-action lawsuit, Core Earnings 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the AAER targets core earnings, and AudCen is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is targeted by an 
associated SEC AAER. Rstate is the magnitude change in earnings for a firm that issues a restatement prior to the announcement of an SEC investigation, Size is 
measured as the natural log of total assets, and Leverage is calculated as the sum of long and short term debt divided by equity. 
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5.3 CHANGE IN COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL AS A RESULT OF INVESTIGATION 
 Table 7 contains results related to tests of the first set of hypotheses. Table 7 captures the 
impact of an AAER at the announcement date of the investigation on the change in a firm’s cost 
of equity capital. If the market perceives the announcement as negative information, thereby 
suggesting the company’s future cash flows are more risky, we would expect the coefficient for 
AAER to be positive. If the announcement instead alleviates market concerns about the potential 
for an SEC investigation, the coefficient could be insignificant (indicating the increased riskiness 
was captured by a prior event, the announcement confirms the increased riskiness, thereby 
reducing uncertainty). As hypothesized, the coefficient for the AAER independent variable is 
positive and statistically significant. This provides evidence that firms targeted by an SEC 
investigation do in fact suffer an increased cost of equity capital. The coefficient of 0.015 
indicates that a firm targeted by an SEC investigation, on average, experience an increase in cost 
of equity capital of 1.5 percent, controlling for other factors. 
 Once the restatement variable is included (model (8)), the coefficient on AAER remains 
positive and significant. However, the variable Rstate (which represents firms with a preemptive 
restatement) is not statistically significant, providing evidence that a preemptive restatement does 
not appear to preempt the impact of an AAER investigation announcement on the change in cost 
of equity capital. This evidence is not inconsistent with results by Hribar and Jenkins (2004) 
since they measure the change in cost of equity capital surrounding the actual restatement date as 
opposed to the investigation and issue dates utilized in my study. In addition to inconclusive 
results related to Rstate, another variable Hribar and Jenkins (2004) find to be significant in 
explaining cost of equity capital changes surrounding restatements: Leverage, has no impact on 
the change in a firm’s cost of equity capital in this model.  
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Table 7: Impact of SEC Investigation on Firm’s Cost of Equity Capital, Investigation 
Announcement Date, Dependant Variable= Δ in CEC  
 
Variable 
Model (7), 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Model (8),  
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Intercept 0.015 0.016 
t-stat (0.84) (0.85) 
AAER 0.015* 0.016* 
t-stat (1.76) (1.86) 
Rstate -0.004 
t-stat (-0.87) 
Size -0.004 -0.038 
t-stat (-0.89) (-0.87) 
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 
t-stat (-0.62) (-0.63) 
R2 3.34% 4.16% 
Adjusted R2 0.19%  0.16% 
**,* significant at the 5 (10) percent level using one-tailed tests 
(n=128) 
This table reports results related to testing of models (7) and (8) surrounding the investigation announcement date, 
controlling for industry fixed-effects. AAER is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the investigation announcement 
is concurrent with an associated restatement or the firm does not issue a restatement. Rstate is the magnitude change 
in earnings for a firm that issues a restatement prior to the announcement of an SEC investigation. Size is measured 
as the log of total assets as reported at the end of the fiscal year of the announcement of an SEC investigation. 
Leverage is the sum of total long-term debt and short-term debt over total equity at the end of the fiscal year of the 
announcement of an SEC investigation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
 
 Table 8 provides results for Models (9) and (10) for the sample surrounding the issue of 
the SEC’s AAER. In contrast to the results reported in Table 7, the AAER variable is insignificant 
in explaining the change in a firm’s cost of equity capital. Paralleling Table 7, the coefficients on 
RState and Leverage are similarly insignificant. Together, the results of Table 7 and Table 8 
suggest that the issue of an AAER appears to increase the discount factor applied to a firm’s 
valuation surrounding the date the investigation is announced, but does not appear to 
subsequently impact the change when the AAER is issued by the SEC. 
 
5.4 CHANGE IN COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL RELATED TO SEVERITY OF THE 
ASSOCIATED AAER 
 Table 9 reports the results of tests of my third hypothesis related to the severity of the 
AAER by providing analysis of Model (11) for the sample at both the investigation and AAER 
issue dates. The results associated with SeverityComp correspond to tests of the first hypothesis, 
in that no coefficient is significantly correlated with the change in a firm’s cost of equity capital. 
Coefficients on Rstate, Size and Leverage continue to insignificantly different from zero. Table 
10 documents the additional testing of severity from Model (12). The results in Table 10 are 
largely representative of those in Table 9 in that most of the variables are significantly associated 
with the change in a firm’s cost of equity capital. However, MgmtTurn is associated with the 
change in cost of equity capital in the opposite direction from that hypothesized. According to 
the results contained in Table 10, firms with management turnover surrounding the investigation 
announcement appear to have a reduction in cost of equity capital. Based on this result, a 
company could mitigate the increasing cost of equity capital associated with an SEC 
investigation by replacing the CEO or CFO. 
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Table 8: Impact of SEC Investigation on Firm’s Cost of Equity Capital, AAER Issue Date, 
Dependant Variable= Δ in CEC 
 
Variable 
Model (9), 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Model (10),  
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Intercept 0.009 0.010 
t-stat (1.10) (1.25) 
AAER 0.002 0.003 
t-stat (0.40) (0.61) 
Rstate 0.008 
t-stat (1.30) 
Size -0.002 -0.002 
t-stat (-0.89) (-1.16) 
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 
t-stat (-0.65) (-0.70) 
R2 1.20% 1.25% 
Adjusted R2 -1.86%  -1.50% 
**,* significant at the 5 (10) percent level using one-tailed tests 
(n=134) 
This table reports results related to testing of models (9) and (10) surrounding the investigation announcement date, 
controlling for industry fixed-effects. AAER is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the investigation announcement 
is concurrent with an associated restatement or the firm does not issue a restatement. Rstate is the magnitude change 
in earnings for a firm that issues a restatement prior to the announcement of an SEC investigation. Size is measured 
as the log of total assets as reported at the end of the fiscal year of the announcement of an SEC investigation. 
Leverage is the sum of total long-term debt and short-term debt over total equity at the end of the fiscal year of the 
announcement of an SEC investigation. 
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Table 9: Influence of Severity on the Change in Cost of Equity Capital (Dependent 
Variable= Δ in CEC) 
Panel A: Investigation Announcement Date Sample (n=64) 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 0.045 1.00 
Severity Composite -0.002 -0.16 
Rstate -0.003 -0.58 
Size -0.008 -0.92 
Leverage -0.000 -0.54 
R2 2.77% 
Adjusted R2 -5.76%   
 
 
 
Panel B: AAER Issue Date (n=67) 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 0.024 1.84 
Severity Composite -0.003 -0.84 
Rstate 0.008 1.68 
Size -0.004 -1.45 
Leverage -0.000 -0.23 
R2 4.96% 
Adjusted R2 1.83%   
*Significant at the 10 percent level using two-tailed tests. 
Reports for model (11), where Severity Composite is the sum of four variables: MgmtTurn, ShldLawst, Core 
Earnings, and AudCen. MgmtTurn is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is fires the CEO or CFO in 
association with the AAER, ShldLawst is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is targeted by a class-action 
lawsuit, Core Earnings is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the AAER targets core earnings, and AudCen is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is targeted by an associated SEC AAER. Rstate is the magnitude 
change in earnings for a firm that issues a restatement prior to the announcement of an SEC investigation, Size is 
measured as the natural log of total assets, and Leverage is calculated as the sum of long and short term debt divided 
by equity. 
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Table 10: Influence of Severity on the Change in Cost of Equity Capital, Individual 
Measures (Dependent Variable= Δ in CEC) 
Panel A: Investigation Announcement Date Sample (n=64) 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 0.040 0.84 
MgmtTurn -0.043* -2.06 
ShldLawst 0.029 1.29 
CoreEarnings 0.016 0.76 
AudCen -0.012 -0.40 
Rstate -0.002 -0.33 
Size -0.006 -0.65 
Leverage -0.000 -0.16 
R2 13.02% 
Adjusted R2 0.13%   
 
 
 
Panel B: AAER Issue Date (n=67) 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 0.019 1.30 
MgmtTurn -0.002 -0.40 
ShldLawst -0.001 -0.16 
CoreEarnings -0.001 -0.12 
AudCen -0.015 -1.29 
Rstate 0.008 1.40 
Size -0.003 -1.13 
Leverage -0.000 -0.69 
R2 14.74% 
Adjusted R2 2.98%   
*Significant at the 10 percent level using two-tailed tests. 
Reports for model (12), where AudCen. MgmtTurn is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is fires the CEO or 
CFO in association with the AAER, ShldLawst is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is targeted by a class-
action lawsuit, Core Earnings is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the AAER targets core earnings, and AudCen is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is targeted by an associated SEC AAER. Rstate is the magnitude 
change in earnings for a firm that issues a restatement prior to the announcement of an SEC investigation, Size is 
measured as the natural log of total assets, and Leverage is calculated as the sum of long and short term debt divided 
by equity. 
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 Overall, the results from Table 7 provide evidence that the announcement of an SEC 
investigation is associated with an increasing cost of equity capital relative to a matched sample 
of firms. Table 8 provides no evidence that the presence of an SEC investigation, as evidenced 
by an AAER, increases or decreases the cost of equity capital for targeted firms when an AAER is 
issued. Finally, Tables 9 and 10 provide no evidence (with the exception of management 
turnover) that several proxies for the severity of an SEC AAER are associated with the change in 
a firm’s cost of equity capital. Several explanations exist to explain my inconclusive results 
related to tables 8, 9, and 10. First, it is possible the market is not concerned with the conclusion 
of the SEC’s investigation. Alternatively, the market is capturing the impact of the SEC’s 
investigation via an alternative information source, such as expectations based on details 
surrounding a preceding restatement or actions by other government agencies (e.g., The 
Department of Justice). My inconclusive findings may also be the result of measurement error in 
variables or power issues related to the relatively small sample size. In other words, the 
hypothesized relations may exist, but my study is not powerful enough to capture the effect.  
Additionally, the use of ex post proxies of severity to determine ex ante severity assumes the 
market can anticipate the potential severity of the investigation before receiving confirmation. 
Although I argue for the inclusion of ex post measures in Chapter 4 (p. 32), it is possible this 
assumption is invalid. 
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5.5 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 As robustness checks, I employ the following modifications to the models and results 
described above. First, I rerun all tests using each individual cost of equity capital measure in 
place of the composite measure. Tables 11-18 document the results of each regression using the 
individual measures of cost of equity capital. Although each measure produces different 
coefficients the overall results remain mostly unchanged from the core results using the 
composite measure, which is unsurprising given the consistency measured by Cronbach’s alpha 
as reported in Chapter 4. However, notable differences exist across the measures. The Gordon 
Growth Model performs differently from any of the other measures, yielding no significant 
coefficients in any model, including those that are significant using the composite or any of the 
other three measures. Each of the other three measures continues to exhibit a significant 
association between an AAER and the change in cost of equity capital surrounding the 
investigation announcement date. All of the individual measures, except again the Gordon 
Growth Model, also continue to manifest a significant association between management turnover 
and the change in cost of equity capital. In most cases, the adjusted R2 is very similar for each 
model, as well as the level of significance documented for relevant variables. These results could 
suggest that the individual measures, with the exception of the Gordon Growth Model, may be 
sufficient for calculating the change in cost of equity capital. 
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Table 11: Impact of SEC Investigation on Firm’s Cost of Equity Capital, Investigation Announcement Date, Dependent 
Variable= Δ in CEC  
 
Variable 
Gordon Growth 
Model 
Gebhardt et 
al.(2001) 
Industry Model 
OJN (2005) 
Economy-wide 
Growth Model 
PEG Ratio  
Method 
Coeffient 
(t-stat) 
Coeffient 
(t-stat) 
Coeffient 
(t-stat) 
Coeffient 
(t-stat) 
Intercept -0.006 0.026 0.019 0.014 
t-stat (1.66) (1.37) (1.02) (0.96) 
  
AAER -0.000 0.015* 0.015* 0.011* 
t-stat (-0.27) (1.76) (1.76) (1.74) 
  
Size 0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.030 
t-stat (0.58) (-0.89) (-0.92) (-0.86) 
  
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
t-stat (-0.68) (-0.62) (-0.61) (-0.66) 
  
  
R2 4.38% 3.34% 3.38% 3.23% 
Adjusted R2 1.27% 0.19% 0.23%  0.08% 
** (*) significant at the 5 (10) percent level using one-tailed tests.  
(n=128) 
This table reports results related to testing of model (7) surrounding the investigation announcement date. AAER is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the 
investigation announcement is concurrent with an associated restatement or the firm does not issue a restatement. Size is measured as the log of total assets as 
reported at the end of the fiscal year of the announcement of an SEC investigation. Leverage is the sum of total long-term debt and short-term debt over total 
equity at the end of the fiscal year of the announcement of an SEC investigation.  
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Table 12: Impact of SEC Investigation on Firm’s Cost of Equity Capital, Investigation Announcement Date, Dependent 
Variable= Δ in CEC  
 
Variable 
Gordon Growth 
Model 
Gebhardt et 
al.(2001) 
Industry Model 
OJN (2005) 
Economy-wide 
Growth Model 
PEG Ratio  
Method 
Coeffient 
(t-stat) 
Coeffient 
(t-stat) 
Coeffient 
(t-stat) 
Coeffient 
(t-stat) 
Intercept -0.006 0.026 0.020 0.014 
t-stat (1.63) (1.38) (1.03) (0.98) 
  
AAER -0.001 0.016* 0.016* 0.012* 
t-stat (-0.28) (1.86) (1.86) (1.84) 
  
RState -0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
t-stat (-0.15) (-0.87) (-0.86) (-0.88) 
  
Size 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
t-stat (0.58) (-0.87) (-0.90) (-0.84) 
  
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
t-stat (-0.66) (-0.63) (-0.62) (-0.67) 
  
R2 4.40% 4.16% 4.20% 4.06% 
Adjusted R2 0.42% 0.16% 0.20%  0.06% 
** (*) significant at the 5 (10) percent level using one-tailed tests.  
(n=128) 
This table reports results related to testing of models (8) surrounding the investigation announcement date. AAER is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the 
investigation announcement is concurrent with an associated restatement or the firm does not issue a restatement. Rstate is the magnitude change in earnings for a 
firm that issues a restatement prior to the announcement of an SEC investigation. Size is measured as the log of total assets as reported at the end of the fiscal 
year of the announcement of an SEC investigation. Leverage is the sum of total long-term debt and short-term debt over total equity at the end of the fiscal year 
of the announcement of an SEC investigation.  
  
54 
Table 13: Impact of SEC Investigation on Firm’s Cost of Equity Capital, AAER Issue Date, Dependent Variable= Δ in CEC  
 
Variable 
Gordon Growth 
Model 
Gebhardt et 
al.(2001) 
Industry Model 
OJN (2005) 
Economy-wide 
Growth Model 
PEG Ratio  
Method 
Coeffient 
(t-stat) 
Coeffient 
(t-stat) 
Coeffient 
(t-stat) 
Coeffient 
(t-stat) 
Intercept -0.009 0.019 0.006 0.011 
t-stat (0.92) (0.29) (.75) (1.28) 
  
AAER 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 
t-stat (0.89) (0.40) (0.41) (0.55) 
  
Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
t-stat (-0.72) (-0.89) (-0.89) (-0.86) 
  
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
t-stat (-0.65) (-0.65) (-0.61) (-0.65) 
  
R2 1.41% 1.20% 1.16% 1.25% 
Adjusted R2 -1.64% -1.86% -1.91%  -1.81% 
** (*) significant at the 5 (10) percent level using one-tailed tests.  
 (n=134) 
This table reports results related to testing of model (9) surrounding AAER issue date. AAER is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the investigation 
announcement is concurrent with an associated restatement or the firm does not issue a restatement. Size is measured as the log of total assets as reported at the 
end of the fiscal year of the announcement of an SEC investigation. Leverage is the sum of total long-term debt and short-term debt over total equity at the end of 
the fiscal year of the announcement of an SEC investigation.  
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Table 14: Impact of SEC Investigation on Firm’s Cost of Equity Capital, AAER Issue Date, Dependent Variable= Δ in CEC  
 
Variable 
Gordon Growth 
Model 
Gebhardt et 
al.(2001) 
Industry Model 
OJN (2005) 
Economy-wide 
Growth Model 
PEG Ratio  
Method 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Intercept 0.010 0.020** 0.007 0.007 
t-stat (1.06) (2.45) (0.89) (0.89) 
  
AAER 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 
t-stat (1.10) (0.61) (0.63) (0.63) 
  
RState 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
t-stat (1.24) (1.30) (1.31) (1.33) 
  
Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
t-stat (-0.98) (-1.16) (-1.16) (-1.13) 
  
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
t-stat (-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.66) (-0.70) 
  
R2 5.02% 5.12% 5.10% 5.25% 
Adjusted R2 1.32% 1.42% 1.39%  1.55% 
 ** (*) significant at the 5 (10) percent level using one-tailed tests.  
 (n=134) 
This table reports results related to testing of models (10) surrounding the AAER issue date. AAER is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the investigation 
announcement is concurrent with an associated restatement or the firm does not issue a restatement. Rstate is the magnitude change in earnings for a firm that 
issues a restatement prior to the announcement of an SEC investigation. Size is measured as the log of total assets as reported at the end of the fiscal year of the 
announcement of an SEC investigation. Leverage is the sum of total long-term debt and short-term debt over total equity at the end of the fiscal year of the 
announcement of an SEC investigation.  
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Table 15: Influence of Severity on the Change in Cost of Equity Capital, Investigation Announcement Date, Dependent 
Variable= Δ in CEC  
Variable 
Gordon Growth 
Model 
Gebhardt et 
al.(2001) 
Industry Model 
OJN (2005) 
Economy-wide 
Growth Model 
PEG Ratio  
Method 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Intercept -0.007 0.055 0.048 0.035 
t-stat (-1.06) (1.22) (1.07) (1.05) 
  
Severity Composite -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
t-stat (-0.48) (-0.16) (-0.17) (-0.19) 
  
RState -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
t-stat (-0.23) (-0.58) (-0.57) (-0.59) 
  
Size 0.001 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 
t-stat (0.87) (-0.92) (-0.93) (-0.88) 
  
Leverage -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 
t-stat (-0.79) (-0.54) (-0.53) (-0.58) 
  
R2 5.55% 2.77% 2.78% 2.80% 
Adjusted R2 -2.79% -5.76% -5.75%  -5.73% 
** (*) significant at the 5 (10) percent level using one-tailed tests.  
 (n=64) 
Reports for model (11) surrounding the investigation announcement date, where Severity Composite is the sum of four variables: MgmtTurn, ShldLawst, Core 
Earnings, and AudCen. MgmtTurn is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is fires the CEO or CFO in association with the AAER, ShldLawst is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the firm is targeted by a class-action lawsuit, Core Earnings is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the AAER targets core earnings, and 
AudCen is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is targeted by an associated SEC AAER. Rstate is the magnitude change in earnings for a firm that 
issues a restatement prior to the announcement of an SEC investigation, Size is measured as the natural log of total assets, and Leverage is calculated as the sum 
of long and short term debt divided by equity. 
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Table 16: Influence of Severity on the Change in Cost of Equity Capital, Investigation Announcement Date, Individual 
Measures, Dependent Variable= Δ in CEC 
 
Variable 
Gordon Growth 
Model 
Gebhardt et 
al.(2001) 
Industry Model 
OJN (2005) 
Economy-wide 
Growth Model 
PEG Ratio  
Method 
Intercept -0.006 0.050 0.043 0.032 
  
MgmtTurn -0.002 -0.043* -0.044* -0.033* 
  
ShldLawst -0.002 0.029 0.030 0.022 
  
CoreEarnings 0.000 0.016 0.015 0.012 
  
AudCen 0.001 -0.012 -0.012 -0.009 
  
RState -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  
Size 0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 
  
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  
R2 6.72% 13.02% 13.28% 13.24% 
Adjusted R2 -7.10% 0.13% 0.43%  0.39% 
** (*) significant at the 5 (10) percent level using one-tailed tests.  
 (n=64)  
Reports for model (12) surrounding the investigation announcement date, where all variables are as defined in Table 10. 
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Table 17: Influence of Severity on the Change in Cost of Equity Capital, AAER Issue Date, Dependent Variable= Δ in CEC  
 
Variable 
Gordon Growth 
Model 
Gebhardt et 
al.(2001) 
Industry Model 
OJN (2005) 
Economy-wide 
Growth Model 
PEG Ratio  
Method 
Intercept 0.033* 0.034** 0.021 0.028** 
t-stat (2.20) (2.60) (1.62) (2.11) 
  
Severity Composite -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
t-stat (-1.08) (-0.84) (-0.74) (-0.89) 
  
RState 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 
t-stat (0.69) (0.68) (0.67) (0.73) 
  
Size -0.005* -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
t-stat (-1.76) (-1.45) (-1.50) (-1.57) 
  
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
t-stat (-0.72) (-0.64) (-0.58) (-0.66) 
  
R2 4.02% 2.96% 2.94% 3.58% 
Adjusted R2 -6.97% -5.83% -5.80%  -6.50% 
** (*) significant at the 5 (10) percent level using one-tailed tests.  
 (n=67) 
Reports for model (11) surrounding the AAER issue date, where Severity Composite is the sum of four variables: MgmtTurn, ShldLawst, Core Earnings, and 
AudCen. MgmtTurn is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is fires the CEO or CFO in association with the AAER, ShldLawst is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the firm is targeted by a class-action lawsuit, Core Earnings is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the AAER targets core earnings, and AudCen is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is targeted by an associated SEC AAER. Rstate is the magnitude change in earnings for a firm that issues a 
restatement prior to the announcement of an SEC investigation, Size is measured as the natural log of total assets, and Leverage is calculated as the sum of long 
and short term debt divided by equity. 
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Table 18: Influence of Severity on the Change in Cost of Equity Capital, AAER Issue Date, Individual Measures, Dependent 
Variable= Δ in CEC 
 
Variable 
Gordon Growth 
Model 
Gebhardt et 
al.(2001) 
Industry Model 
OJN (2005) 
Economy-wide 
Growth Model 
PEG Ratio  
Method 
Intercept 0.028 0.029 0.016 0.023 
  
MgmtTurn -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
  
ShldLawst -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  
CoreEarnings -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  
AudCen -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 
  
RState 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 
  
Size -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
  
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  
R2 15.11% 14.74% 14.65% 15.10% 
Adjusted R2 3.40% 2.98% 2.87% 3.39% 
** (*) significant at the 5 (10) percent level using one-tailed tests.  
 (n=67)  
Reports for model (12) surrounding the AAER issue date, where all variables are as defined in Table 10. 
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I conduct non-parametric testing by converting all variables to ranks and running each 
model with the ranked variables. The results of these rank regressions are consistent with all the 
core results in tables 7, 8, 9 and 10. I then use Huber and Tukey bi-weights to reduce the 
influence of outliers by scaling residuals by the absolute median residual. Results using the bi-
weights are similar to the core results of the paper reported on Table 7, which indicates that the 
positive association between the change in cost of capital and an AAER investigation 
announcement is robust to non-parametric testing.  There are, however, using bi-weighted 
regressions reveals two notable inconsistencies in the statistical results. First, leverage is 
negative and significant in the robust regressions. The second notable difference surfaces in the 
severity components surrounding the investigation date. Table 20 provides results for non-
parametric regressions of the component variables. Noteworthy differences from Table 10 
include the weakened significance for the management turnover variable, and the significant 
results for leverage. Overall, non-parametric testing does not change the core findings of this 
paper; however, the results indicate that leverage may be more significant than results using 
parametric testing. 
  Next, I rerun each model removing industry fixed-effects, also resulting in no change in 
core results. I run each model with two-digit SIC fixed-effects in place of one-digit SIC fixed-
effects; this takes the number of industry indicator variables from seven (eight industries) to 27 
(28 industries). With the two-digit SIC codes my results related to change in cost of equity 
capital surrounding the investigation announcement become marginally less significant and the 
models become over specified (resulting in a negative R2 for almost all models). Additional 
testing is also conducted by replacing the Rstate 
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Table 19: Impact of SEC Investigation on Firm’s Cost of Equity Capital, Investigation 
Announcement Date Using Robust Regression, Dependant Variable= Δ in CEC  
 
Variable 
Model (7), 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Model (8),  
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Intercept -0.006 -0.006 
t-stat (-1.10) (-1.15) 
AAER 0.004 0.005* 
t-stat (1.56) (1.95) 
Rstate -0.001 
t-stat (-0.89) 
Size 0.001 0.001 
t-stat (0.65) (0.66) 
Leverage -0.000* -0.000** 
t-stat (-1.97) (-2.09) 
R2 3.45% 5.04% 
Adjusted R2 1.12%  1.90% 
**,* significant at the 5 (10) percent level using one-tailed tests 
(n=128) 
This table reports results related to testing of models (7) and (8) surrounding the investigation announcement date, 
controlling for industry fixed-effects. AAER is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the investigation announcement 
is concurrent with an associated restatement or the firm does not issue a restatement. Rstate is the magnitude change 
in earnings for a firm that issues a restatement prior to the announcement of an SEC investigation. Size is measured 
as the log of total assets as reported at the end of the fiscal year of the announcement of an SEC investigation. 
Leverage is the sum of total long-term debt and short-term debt over total equity at the end of the fiscal year of the 
announcement of an SEC investigation.  
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Table 20: Influence of Severity on the Change in Cost of Equity Capital Using Robust 
Regression, Individual Measures (Dependent Variable= Δ in CEC) 
Panel A: Investigation Announcement Date Sample (n=64) 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 0.011 1.14 
MgmtTurn -0.008 -1.56 
ShldLawst 0.006 1.19 
CoreEarnings -0.001 -0.32 
AudCen 0.009 1.33 
Rstate -0.001 -0.67 
Size -0.003 -1.23 
Leverage 0.001** 2.88 
R2 11.48% 
Adjusted R2 0.96%   
***,**,* significant at the 5 (10,20) percent level using two-tailed tests 
Reports for model (12), where AudCen. MgmtTurn is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is fires the CEO or 
CFO in association with the AAER, ShldLawst is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is targeted by a class-
action lawsuit, Core Earnings is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the AAER targets core earnings, and AudCen is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is targeted by an associated SEC AAER. Rstate is the magnitude 
change in earnings for a firm that issues a restatement prior to the announcement of an SEC investigation, Size is 
measured as the natural log of total assets, and Leverage is calculated as the sum of long and short term debt divided 
by equity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
 
variable (which captures the magnitude of earnings changes for restating firms) with an indicator 
variable set equal to one for firms that restate earnings prior to an SEC investigation. Results 
using the indicator restatement variable are consistent with the results presented in the all tables. 
Finally, I test each model after winsorization at 1%/99% on the change in cost of equity capital 
variable. Results from the regressions using winsorization continue to be significant for the 
investigation announcement date (the t-stat for AAER in Table 7 becomes 1.92). All other results 
maintain insignificance after winzorization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Prior research uses SEC AAERs as a proxy for fraudulent financial reporting and 
documents some of the negative consequences suffered by targeted firms. However, the impact 
of an AAER on a firm’s cost of equity capital is largely unexamined; I examine the impact of 
SEC AAERs on a firm’s cost of equity capital. Furthermore, I use proxies for the severity of an 
AAER to further refine our understanding of the impact of an AAER on a firm’s cost of equity 
capital. The results of my statistical analysis provide evidence of the impact of an SEC AAER on 
a firm’s cost of equity capital when the investigation is first disclosed to the public. My results 
are exclusive to the period surrounding the announcement of the SEC investigation; similar 
statistical analysis does not provide evidence of an impact on a firm’s cost of equity capital 
surrounding the period when the SEC issues an AAER. Proxies for severity yield no statistical 
associations between the perceived severity of the AAER and the change in a firm’s cost of 
equity capital. Possible explanations for the absence of an associated impact include the lack of 
important information delivered to the market via an SEC investigation, alternative sources of 
the associated change in riskiness preempting the information to the market, measurement error 
in the employed variables, and power issues due to the small sample size.   
Several questions arise as a result of this study which could provide opportunities for 
future studies. Civil lawsuits related to a restatement likely provide direct information to the 
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market regarding the measurable cost of a restatement. An SEC investigation may provide 
further evidence for the plaintiff in such cases. It would be interesting to repeat the analysis in 
this paper for the event date surrounding the announcement of a civil lawsuit. The content of the 
AAER could also be relevant, as it is possible that the market evaluates the aggressiveness of the 
SEC as reflected in the AAER and alters expectations about future cash flows based on the 
probability of the success of associated lawsuits. Future research could focus on this variation in 
the ‘tone’ of the AAER to measure severity. 
The insignificant results could also be a result of the measurement tool; the various 
models employed to capture cost of equity capital. It is possible that the cost of equity capital 
measures are not capturing the change in a firm’s cost of equity capital, and therefore do not 
manifest significance when paired with AAER variables. If future academic research discovers 
alternative methods of capturing the cost of equity capital, the impact of the SEC’s investigation 
could be retested using models developed in this paper coupled with the alternative measures.  
The past decade has witnessed a large body of academic research directed at evaluating 
these implied cost of equity capital measures. The appendix contains a sampling of papers 
evaluating the measures and criticisms related to the measures. In order to analyze the cost of 
equity capital measures and recent iterations, ideally one could use an event study with an event 
in which clear ex ante expectations about the change in cost of equity capital are known. If future 
studies are able to document and establish the impact of new measures for capturing the cost of 
equity capital, future studies could utilize this event to evaluate the recently suggested 
modifications to the cost of equity capital measures.  
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Appendix: Studies evaluating the cost of equity capital measures employed in this paper 
Two recognized accounting studies evaluate the four measures summarized in Chapter 4. 
Botosan and Plumlee (2005) (herafter BP) assess the measures by regressing the measures on 
proxies for risk that BP expect to be associated with the cost of equity capital. The risk factor 
proxies include information risk, market beta, leverage, growth, and firm size. Regression results 
lead BP to conclude that the Target Price Model28 and the PEG ratio method yield superior 
measures based on their stronger (compared to the other models) association with all of the 
tested proxies for risk. However, the results in BP are based on small differences in coefficients 
and statistical power. For example, the Target Price Model has one of the lowest R2s of the five 
measures, but is chosen because it is correlated with all five risk proxies. 
Easton and Monahan (2005) evaluate all but one of the measures29 from BP using a 
decomposition of earnings developed by Vuolteenaho (2002). The authors find that the evaluated 
measures are not reliable measures of ex post realized returns. Easton and Monahan’s (2005) 
results hold despite attempts to remove measurement error by utilizing grouping and 
instrumental variables. In a recent study, by removing the predictable error from analysts’ 
forecasts before calculating the measures, Gode and Mohanram (2008) are able to improve the 
measures tested in Easton and Monahan’s (2005) study as evidenced by an improved association 
with realized returns. 
 Many recent papers also suggest several model transformations that attempt to improve 
(or further discourage the use of) the models of implied cost of equity capital. For example, 
Easton and Sommers (2007) suggest that removal of analyst optimism in the forecasts input into 
the models removes the equity premium (cost of equity capital as measured by the models less 
                                                 
28 The Target Price Method is not included in this study. 
29 The Target Price Method (Botosan & Plumlee 2004) is excluded from Easton and Monahan’s (2005) analysis. 
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the risk free rate). Gode and Mohanram (2008) document an improvement in the models 
association with realized returns when the models are adjusted by removing predictable analyst 
forecast errors. 
